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Abstract
Distributed structure of individual data makes it necessary for data holders to per-
form collaborative analysis over the collective database for better data mining results.
However each site has to ensure the privacy of its individual data, which means no
information is revealed about individual values. Privacy preserving distributed data
mining is utilized for that purpose. In this study, we try to draw more attention to
the topic of privacy preserving data mining by showing a model which is realistic for
data mining, and allows for very efficient protocols. We give two protocols which are
useful tools in data mining: a protocol for Yao’s millionaires problem, and a protocol
for numerical distance. Our solution to Yao’s millionaires problem is of independent
interest since it gives a solution which improves on known protocols with respect to
both computation complexity and communication overhead. This protocol can be used
for different purposes in privacy preserving data mining algorithms such as comparison
and equality test of data records. Our numerical distance protocol is also applicable
to variety of algorithms. In this study we applied our numerical distance protocol in a
privacy preserving distributed clustering protocol for horizontally partitioned data. We
show application of our protocol over different attribute types such as interval-scaled,
binary, nominal, ordinal, ratio-scaled, and alphanumeric. We present proof of security
of our protocol, and explain communication, and computation complexity analysis in
detail.
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MAHREMI˙YET KORUYUCU VERI˙ MADENCI˙LI˙G˘I˙ I˙C¸I˙N BI˙R KU¨TU¨PHANE
GERC¸EKLEMESI˙
Selim Volkan Kaya
Bilgisayar Bilimi ve Mu¨hendislig˘i, Yu¨ksek Lisans Tezi, 2007
Tez Danıs¸manları: Doc¸. Dr. Erkay Savas¸ ve Yrd. Doc¸. Dr. Yu¨cel Saygın
Anahtar so¨zcu¨kler: Veri Madencilig˘i, Kriptografi, Gu¨venli C¸oklu Hesaplama, Dag˘ıtık
Hesaplama, Algoritmalar
O¨zet
Gu¨nu¨mu¨zde verilerin kurumlar arasındaki dag˘ıtık yapısı, kurumların bu veriler
u¨zerinde daha iyi raporlamar almaları ic¸in ortak hesaplama yapmalarını gerekli kılmıs¸tır.
Bununlar birlikte, ortak hesaplama evresinde herbir veri sahibi kurum kendi verisinin
mahremiyetini sag˘lamalı ve hic¸bir kis¸isel veriyi ac¸ıg˘a c¸ıkartmamalıdır. Mahremiyet
koruyucu veri madencilig˘i is¸te bu noktada devreye girer. Bu c¸alıs¸mamızda veri maden-
cilig˘i ic¸in gerc¸ekc¸i ve c¸ok daha verimli is¸lem yapılmasına olanak sag˘layacak protokoller
o¨nererek mahremiyet koruyucu veri madencilig˘ine dikkatleri daha fazla c¸ekmek istedik.
Bu amac¸la veri madencilig˘i ic¸in yararlı iki farklı protokol o¨nerisinde bulunduk. Bu pro-
tokoller Yao’nun milyonerler problemi ve sayısal fark protokolleridir. Yao’nun milyoner-
ler problemi ic¸in o¨nerdig˘imiz method bugu¨ne kadar aynı problem ic¸in o¨nerilen method-
lardan haberles¸me ve is¸lem yu¨ku¨ ac¸ısından c¸ok daha iyi sonuc¸lar vermis¸tir. Ayrıca bu
methodun veri madencilig˘inin pek c¸ok alanında kullanımı vardır. Buna o¨rnek olarak
veri kayıtlarının kars¸ılas¸tırılması ve es¸itlik testi yapılması verilebilir. O¨nerdig˘imiz
ikinci method olan sayısal fark protokolu¨nu¨n de mahremiyet koruyucu veri maden-
cilig˘inde pek c¸ok uygulaması vardır. Bu c¸alıs¸mamızda, sayısal fark protokolu¨mu¨zu¨
yatay olarak dag˘ıtılmıs¸ verinin mahremiyeti koruyarak gruplanması protokolu¨ne uygu-
ladık. Ayrıca sayısal fark protokolu¨mu¨zu¨n sıralı, sayısal, alfabetik, aralık-o¨lc¸ekli ve
oran-o¨lc¸ekli veri tipleri u¨zerinde sorunsuz c¸alıs¸tıg˘ını go¨sterdik. Buna ek olarak, sayısal
fark protokolu¨mu¨zu¨n gu¨venli oldug˘unun ispatını, haberles¸me ve is¸lem yu¨ku¨nu¨ detayları
ile ac¸ıkladık.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Advances in data storage technologies make it possible to store and manage huge
amounts of data. When combined with advanced access and processing capabilities,
this provides new opportunities such as extracting new information from the stored
data. Data mining techniques provide added value to data by extracting interesting and
previously unknown patterns. The mined information is valuable but also sensitive from
the privacy perspective since it may reveal confidential information about individuals.
Therefore, data mining algorithms have to take privacy into consideration and they
must guarantee that no sensitive information is retrieved without the consent of the
data holder.
Privacy preserving distributed data mining is a new area of research which deserves
more attention from the cryptology community. When personal data, spread out over
several sites, is collected, and data mining or other analysis is performed on the joint
data, the privacy of sensitive information is at risk. In recent years the data mining
community has started to address these privacy issues, but no satisfactory protocols
have been suggested so far.
Today personal data is spread out over several servers. Many governmental and
private institutions collect data about their users and clients. In some cases it is fruitful
to collect this data, and perform analysis on the union of all personal data available.
In other words, many data-holders decide to join their data, and perform an analysis
whose result is of mutual interest to the data-holders. On the other hand, each data-
holder wants to protect the privacy of his clients, so he is not willing to reveal the data
in his database.
Since the databases are often of considerable size, efficiency — especially in com-
munication — is of paramount importance. Even a constant overhead of a hundred,
say, is impractical if the databases contains terabytes of data.
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1.1 Contributions of this Research
The goal of this study is to demonstrate that protocols with only a small constant
communication and computation overhead can be made for privacy-preserving data
mining. The main observation is that the use of semi-honest third parties is a re-
alistic assumption for data mining applications. Our protocols use 2–3 semi-honest,
non-colluding third parties, who receive secret shares of inputs. The data mining is
performed on the secret shares as in many other multi party computation protocols. If
we choose third parties who have an interest in the true result of the data mining, it
is fair to assume that they behave according to the protocol. We can guarantee non-
collusion by choosing third parties that have conflicting interests in the actual data.
As an example one third party can be a consumer organisation who is interested in the
privacy of consumers, while another third party is a representative of the industry —
they both have interests in the right outcome, but will never collude. Another benefit
of this model is that, while data-holders might only have limited computing power and
bandwidth, third parties with high computing power and bandwidth can be chosen.
In this study, two protocols are proposed taking the assumptions above into consid-
eration. The first protocol we propose is a numeric distance protocol. According to the
protocol, taking two private numeric values as inputs, absolute value of the distance
of these two numeric values is obtained without revealing none of the private inputs.
As an application of our numeric distance protocol, we propose a privacy preserving
distributed clustering algorithm.
The second protocol we propose is a greater-than-function protocol which answers
the question ’Is X greater than Y?’ without revealing private values X and Y. We show
that our protocol is the most efficient approach among the other protocols proposed
for the same problem. Our protocol can be applied in several privacy preserving data
mining algorithms such as Yao’s Millionaires’ problem, equivalence test, and record
matching.
2
CHAPTER 2
Privacy Preserving Clustering over
Horizontally Partitioned Data
2.1 Introduction
Recent advances in data management technologies, especially in the directions of perfor-
mance and storage capacity, cause a boost in database applications in the past decade.
Every organization tries to manage their customers or members through database man-
agement systems. However plain data has no meaning in the analytical sense, and it
has to be processed through some inference mechanisms. Data mining appears at that
point with the promise of extracting non-trivial and sensitive information from large
collections of data such as association rules, clusters and classification models. Valu-
able information extracted from plain data by means of data mining has a variety of
application areas such as segmentation of customers for determining future marketing
strategy, or analyzing associations among products with respect to buying behavior of
customers for determining shelf arrangement in a supermarket.
Today individual data is distributed among several organizations, and organizations
need to collaborate for better results by performing analysis on the union of all individ-
ual data available. However, privacy of individual data is important since migration of
data to an organization other than the holder of that data could reveal sensitive infor-
mation about each individual. Privacy preserving distributed data mining(PPDDM)
is utilized for this purpose. Accordingly, PPDDM tries to produce global results from
local databases without violating privacy of individuals.
Efficiency in communication and computation is crucial in PPDDM since databases
are often of considerable size. Sample scenarios are sensor networks or RFID applica-
tions, where the sensor nodes or RFID readers that contain the data (data holders) have
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very limited computation and communication capacity. In such scenarios, reducing the
communication and computation costs is of utmost importance.
In this study we propose a new setting for privacy preserving clustering over hori-
zontally partitioned data with only a small constant communication and computation
overhead for data holders with no loss of accuracy. As stated by Inan et al.[11], we
reduce privacy preserving clustering problem to privacy preserving dissimilarity ma-
trix computation problem. After dissimilarity matrix is computed privately, it can be
input to any hierarchical clustering algorithm. Our protocol uses two semi-honest, non-
colluding third parties, who receive secret shares of inputs and compute intermediary
results, while a data miner performs the actual clustering.
The main observation we make is that the use of semi-honest third parties is a
realistic assumption for data mining applications. If we choose third parties who have
an interest in the true result of the data mining, it is fair to assume that they behave
according to the protocol. We can guarantee non-collusion by choosing third parties
that have conflicting interests in the actual data. As an example one third party can be
a consumer organization who is interested in the privacy of consumers, while another
third party is a representative of the industry — they both have interests in the right
outcome, but will never collude. Another benefit of this model is that, while data-
holders might only have limited computing power and bandwidth, third parties with
high computing power and bandwidth can be chosen. The most important benefit of
our protocol is that the communication cost of all participants is linear in the size of the
databases. Our protocol gives information theoretical security under the assumption
that the two third parties follow the protocol, and do not collude to extract information.
2.2 Related Work and Background
The first protocols for PPDDM are proposed by Agrawal and Srikant[2],and Lindell
and Pinkas[17] in 2000. In [2], Agrawal and Srikant use data perturbation for con-
struction of a classification model privately. The basic idea is that original data values
can be perturbed in such a way that original distribution of the aggregated data can
be recovered but not the individual data values. Perturbation technique is efficient to
implement however results in several side effects. First of all, even though the distribu-
tion of original values can be predicted with a certain confidence level, some accuracy
is lost. Secondly, modification of data does not fully preserve privacy of individual
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values, and may cause privacy breaches as shown in [6, 7]. Finally, perturbation has a
predictable structure for certain cases and hence may not fully preserve privacy [13]. A
different perturbation method is proposed by Saygin et al.[24] in 2001 for association
rule hiding, where unknown values are introduced to hide sensitive association rules.
As a consequence of unknown values, new association rules are created which causes
computation overhead, and some insensitive rules present before perturbation process
are lost which causes accuracy lost.
[17] employs cryptography as its main tool and implements a decision tree learning
protocol. However oblivious transfer, which is the main building block of this pro-
tocol, causes huge computation and communication overhead due to exponentiation
operations for each bit of private inputs and expansion of each bit of private data as a
result of exponentiation respectively. [12] proposes a privacy preserving association rule
mining protocol over horizontally partitioned data taking advantage of commutative
encryption. Nevertheless the protocol requires encryption and decryption operations
to be performed over each private input by all of the participants resulting in a large
communication and computation cost.
Several protocols are proposed for privacy preserving clustering. Oliveira and Za-
iane [19] introduce geometric data transformation methods(GDTMs) to distort confi-
dential data values. The protocol tries to preserve main features of the confidential
data for clustering while perturbing the data to meet privacy requirements. However,
perturbation causes accuracy losses in clustering, and privacy of the data is not fully
guaranteed. Consequently, Oliveira and Zaiane [20] introduce the notion of Rotation-
Based Transformation(RBT). RBT provides confidentiality of attribute values while
completely preserving the original clustering results. However RBT method has a
computation overhead since attribute values are transformed pairwise, and selection
of attribute pairs should be done in such a way that variance between the original
and transformed attributes are maximum. In [21], Oliveira and Zaiane propose Object
Similarity-Based Representation(OSBR) and Dimensionality Reduction-Based Repre-
sentation(DRBT) methods for clustering over centralized and vertically partitioned
databases. Therefore, OSBR has high computation cost since each data owner sends a
dissimilarity matrix to a central party yielding a communication complexity of O(n2),
while DRBT can cause loss of accuracy due to dimensionality reduction in the original
data.
Merugu and Ghosh [18], and Klusch, Lodi and Moro [14] propose privacy preserving
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clustering methods based on sharing models representing the original data instead of
sharing the original data itself. Accordingly, clustering can be performed over the
model without revealing the original data points. However clustering over low quality
representatives of the original data causes loss of accuracy while efforts for high quality
representatives means loss of privacy.
Vaidya and Clifton [26] propose a privacy preserving k-means clustering protocol
based on secure multi-party(SMC) computation. Nevertheless there is a huge commu-
nication and computation cost due to iterative execution of several SMC protocols till
a convergence point for the clusters is obtained. Jha, Kruger and McDaniel propose
two privacy preserving k-means clustering protocols for horizontally partitioned data in
[23]. The protocols use homomorphic encryption and oblivious polynomial evaluation
as their building block which are inefficient to be applied over large databases due to
cost of modular exponentiation and oblivious transfer respectively.
The most recent study for privacy preserving clustering is proposed by Inan et
al. [11] over horizontally partitioned data and the problem is reduced to secure com-
putation of dissimilarity matrix which will be input to any clustering algorithm but
k-means. Each entry of the dissimilarity matrix is computed by a secure difference
protocol where confidential data points are disguised by pseudo-random values and the
disguise is removed by a trusted third party revealing the final difference. However
secure difference protocol leads to privacy breaches because of the way pseudo-random
values are used. According to the secure difference protocol, initiator of the proto-
col creates two disguise factors; one for follower of the protocol to disguise initiators
value and the other for the trusted third party to disguise which participants input is
subtracted from the other. Nevertheless the latter disguise factor is the same for each
entry point within a row of dissimilarity matrix. In other words, trusted third party
can guess which site’s input is subtracted from the other with a probability of 1
2
for
each row. On the other hand, quadratic communication cost for dissimilarity matrix
computation is a huge burden for data holders.
2.3 Preliminaries
In our scenario we have ` data holders : DH1, . . . , DH` where DHi has a database
with ni objects: o
i
1, . . . , o
i
ni
. The databases all have the same [schema] with m integer
attributes (from a finite field). Since all databases have the same schema, we can write
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the union of the databases as o1, o2, . . . , oN , where N =
∑`
i=1 ni, and where object oi
has attributes ai1, . . . , a
i
m. We say that the collective database is horizontally partitioned
between the ` data holders.
The goal of our protocol is to compute the dissimilarity matrix of all objects in all
databases, while keeping the actual values secret. Each entry of the dissimilarity matrix
contains the weighted Manhattan distance between two elements from the collective
database.
Dij =
m∑
k=1
wk|a
i
k − a
j
k|, (2.1)
where i, j = 1, . . . , N , and w1, . . . , wm are predefined weights. We introduce the notion
of partial dissimilarity matrices which contains the numerical distance between a single
attribute, so that the dissimilarity matrix can be written
D =
m∑
k=1
wkD
k, (2.2)
where Dk is the dissimilarity matrix with entries Dk[i, j] = |aik−a
j
k| which results from
considering only the kth attribute.
2.3.1 Homomorphic Secret Sharing
Informally secret sharing is a way to share a secret among m players in a way that
t− 1 or less colluding players cannot compute any information about the secret, but t
arbitrary players can recover the secret. A player that wishes to share his secret s will
create m secret-shares s1, . . . , sm and send one share to each player [3, 25].
The protocols we present in this study rely on additive secret sharing. To share a
secret integer1 s between two players, we choose a random integer r and give the share
r to the first player and the share s− r to the second player. Clearly both shares are
random when observed alone, so no single player can compute any information about
the secret. The secret is revealed by simply adding the two shares together, so the two
players can recover the secret together.
A secret sharing scheme is said to be homomorphic with respect to a binary oper-
ation · if there is a binary operation ? such that ci = ai ? bi, i = 1, . . . ,m are secret
shares of the secret a · b, when ai, bi are secret shares of a and b respectively.
Additive secret sharing is homomorphic with respect to addition: adding shares
1Or more precisely: to share an element from an additive group.
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pairwise, gives an additive sharing of the sum of the secrets.
2.4 Our Protocol
There are two challenges for designing a protocol for computing Manhattan distance:(1)not
to reveal private inputs, (2)to hide which input is the largest. We employ additive ho-
momorphic secret sharing to fulfill the first challenge, with a very small communication
and computation overhead for the data holders. The inputs are shared between two
semi-honest non-colluding third parties, TP1 and TP2, who can compute a secret shar-
ing of the difference between by using the homomorphic property. To avoid revealing
the sign of the difference (which input is larger), TP1 and TP2 share a pseudo random
number generator. Before the protocol starts TP1 and TP2 will each fill am×N×N ta-
ble, prng, with one bit values(either 0 or 1) from the pseudo random number generator
initialized with a shared seed.
Let ak and bk be the private values for the kth attribute of o
A
i and o
B
j held by
DHA and DHB respectively. The (i, j)th entry in the D
k is |ak− bk|. To compute this
Euclidean distance DHA selects a random number αk, and sends additive shares αk and
ak−αk to third party 1 (TP1) and 2 (TP2) respectively. Likewise DHB creates additive
sharing βk and bk − βk and sends them to TP1 and TP2 respectively. TP1 computes
sh1 = (−1)
prng(k,i,j)(αk−βk) and TP2 computes sh2 = (−1)
prng(k,i,j)((ak−αk)−
(bk − βk)), and they send the results to the miner DM . When DM adds the two
received values the result is
sh1 + sh2 = (−1)
prng(k,i,j)(ak − bk). (2.3)
After receiving the numerical value the miner gets the results |sh1 + sh2| = |a − b|,
which is the required (i, j)th entry of Dk. Overview of our Euclidean distance protocol
is depicted in Figure 2.1.
To construct the dissimilarity matrix for the kth attribute, each data holder DHi
computes additive shares of their private values a1k, a
2
k . . . a
ni
k . The resulting additive
shares of each private value are distributed to secret share arrays si,k1 and s
i,k
2 . The
resulting secret share arrays si,k1 and s
i,k
2 are sent to TP1 and TP1 respectively. Steps
of the protocol for data holders are demonstrated in Algorithm 1.
Receiving s1,k1(2), s
2,k
1(2), . . . , s
`,k
1(2) from all of the data holders, TP1(2) merges these ar-
rays into sk1(2). After merge operation, s
k
1(2) contains additive shares of the collective
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ak− αk
ak bk
αk
βk
bk− βk
A B
TP1 TP2
DM
αk−βk (ak−αk)−(bk−βk)
Figure 2.1: Overview of the numerical distance protocol
Algorithm 1 DHi
Input: private values for attribute k: a1k, a
2
k . . . a
ni
k
Output: secret share arrays si,k1 and s
i,k
2
1: Initialize secret share arrays si,k1 and s
i,k
2 of size ni
2: for j = 1 to ni do
3: (si,k1 [j], s
i,k
2 [j]) = secretshare(a
j
k)
4: end for
5: Sends si,k1 to TP1
6: Sends si,k2 to TP2
database for the kth attribute. Then TP1(2) initializes an N × N matrix D
k
1(2) and
fills each entry (i,j) with value (−1)prng[k,i,j](sk1(2)[a]− s
k
1(2)[b]). The resulting matrix
Dk1(2) is additive share of D
k. TP1(2) sends D
k
1(2) to DM . The details of the protocol
for TP1 are depicted in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 TP1
Input: Secret share arrays s1,k1 , s
2,k
1 , . . . , s
`,k
1 , matrix prng shared with TP2
Output: Secret share matrix Dk1
1: Initialize secret share array sk1 of size N =
∑`
i=1 ni
2: Initialize secret share matrix Dk1 of size N ×N
3: Merge s1,k1 , s
2,k
1 , . . . , s
`,k
1 into s
k
1
4: for a = 1 to N do
5: for b = 1 to N do
6: Dk1 [a, b] = (−1)
prng[k,a,b](sk1[a]− s
k
1[b])
7: end for
8: end for
9: Sends Dk1 to DM
It is trivial for DM to construct Dk from matrices Dk1 and D
k
2 by simply computing
Dk1 [i, j] + D
k
2 [i, j] for each entry (i,j) of D
k. The protocol for DM is depicted in
Algorithm 3.
When all m dissimilarity matrices have been computed, DM can compute the final
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Algorithm 3 DM
Input: Secret share matrices Dk1 and D
k
2
Output: Dk
1: Initialize secret share matrix Dk of size N ×N
2: for a = 1 to N do
3: for b = 1 to N do
4: Dk[a, b] = Dk1 [a, b] +D
k
2 [a, b]
5: end for
6: end for
dissimilarity matrix with the sum in Equation 2.2.
2.4.1 Application of Our Protocol to Different Data Types
As stated in [10], an object can be described by attributes of five different data types:(1)
Interval-Scaled, (2) Binary, (3) Nominal, (4) Ordinal, and (5) Ratio-Scaled. In this
section, we show how to apply our protocol for these data types.
1. Interval-Scaled attributes: These are attributes of continuous value from a linear
scale like age, weight, and height. Our protocol can directly be applied to interval-
scaled variables since this attribute type has numeric values.
2. Binary attributes: This attribute type has two values: 0 or 1. 0 means that
attribute is absent, and 1 means that it is present. For example, attributemarried
is a binary attribute with values Yes(1), and No(0). We can easily adopt our
protocol for a binary attribute k by treating values of k as 0 and 1. As a result,
Dk[x, y] will be 0 if axk = a
y
k, and 1 otherwise.
3. Nominal attributes: Nominal attributes resemble binary attributes, however can
take on more than two states. For instance, attribute weather is nominal with
states sunny, windy, cloudy, and rainy. Application of our protocol to a nominal
attribute is as follows: If number of all possible states for a nominal attribute
k is m, then we can number each attribute value from range 1, 2, . . . ,m. After
computing Dk, non-zero entries of Dk are set to 1.
4. Ordinal attributes: Ordinal attributes are similar to nominal attributes, however
states of ordinal attributes are ordered. Attribute professional rank has values
ordered as assistant, associate, and full. To adopt a nominal attribute k with
m states to our protocol, each state is numbered from range 1, 2, . . . ,m, where
states with higher rank get greater numbers. Then we can treat ordinal attribute
as interval-scaled.
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5. Ratio-Scaled attributes: These are attributes of continuous value from a nonlinear
scale like exponential scale. Growth of a bacteria population is a typical example
for ratio-scaled attributes. A Ratio-Scaled attribute k can easily be adopted
to our protocol by employing logarithmic transformation such as each attribute
value aik is replaced with log a
i
k. The updates attribute values are treated as
interval-scaled attributes.
6. Alphanumeric attributes: These are sequences(strings) of characters from a given
alphabet. Alphanumeric attributes are largely used by bioinformatics. For in-
stance, DNA sequence data is an alphanumeric attribute where alphabet of the
attribute is a,c,g,t. Edit distance[15] is a widely used notion to measure similarity
of two strings with respect to insertions, deletions, and substitutions required to
transform one string to another. For application of an alphanumeric attribute
k to our protocol, each alphanumeric attribute value aik needs to treated as an
array of characters from a finite alphabet and each character is numbered like or-
dinal attributes. For instance; alphabet of a,c,g,t for DNA data is mapped to the
values 0,1,2,3 respectively. Then secret sharing of characters for each attribute aik
is computed by data holders, and secret shares are sent to trusted third parties.
Trusted third parties form matrices which includes secret shares of difference of
each character of an attribute to other attributes’ characters. DM forms the orig-
inal difference matrix by simply adding these two matrices. At that point, as Inan
et al. proposed in [11], Character Comparison Matrix(CCM) is utilized, where
each entry (s,t,i,j) of CCM is filled as the the following: CCM [s][t][i][j] = 0 if ith
character of ask is equal to jth character of a
t
k, and CCM [s][t][i][j] = 1 otherwise.
The final CCM is input to editdistance algorithm to form the final dissimilarity
matrix. The details of the protocol for alphanumeric attributes are depicted in
Algorithm 4,5, and 6 for DHi, TP1, and DM respectively.
2.5 Security of our Protocol
Our security definitions reflects that no (or at least not more than a negligible amount
of) information is revealed about any object in the collective database during the
data-mining protocol. Of course the final result of the protocol will on it’s own reveal
partial information, but information leakage is limited to whatever can be deduced
from the final result. In our protocol the partial dissimilarity matrices are computed
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Algorithm 4 DHi for alphanumeric attributes
Input: private values for attribute k: a1k, a
2
k . . . a
ni
k
Output: secret share arrays si,k1 and s
i,k
2
1: Initialize secret share matrices si,k1 and s
i,k
2 of size ni × len where len =
max(a1k.length, a
2
k.length . . . a
ni
k .length)
2: for j = 1 to ni do
3: for l = 1 to ajk.length do
4: (si,k1 [j][l], s
i,k
2 [j][l]) = secretshare(a
j
k[l])
5: end for
6: end for
7: Sends si,k1 to TP1
8: Sends si,k2 to TP2
Algorithm 5 TP1 for alphanumeric attributes
Input: Secret share matrices s1,k1 , s
2,k
1 , . . . , s
`,k
1 , matrix prng shared with TP2
Output: Secret share matrix Dk1
1: Initialize secret share matrix sk1 of size N × len where N =
∑`
i=1 ni and len =
max(s1,k1 [0].length, s
2,k
1 [0].length, . . . , s
`,k
1 [0].length)
2: Initialize secret share matrix Dk1 of size N ×N × len× len
3: Merge s1,k1 , s
2,k
1 , . . . , s
`,k
1 into s
k
1
4: for a = 1 to N do
5: for b = 1 to N do
6: for c = 1 to sk1[a].length do
7: for d = 1 to sk1[b].length do
8: Dk1 [a, b, c, d] = (−1)
prng[k,a,b,c,d](sk1[a, c]− s
k
1[b, d])
9: end for
10: end for
11: end for
12: end for
13: Sends Dk1 to DM
Algorithm 6 DM for alphanumeric attributes
Input: Secret share matrices Dk1 and D
k
2
Output: Dk
1: Initialize matrix CCM of size N ×N × len× len
2: Initialize secret share matrix Dk of size N ×N
3: for a = 1 to N do
4: for b = 1 to N do
5: for c = 1 to Dk1 [a][b].length do
6: for d = 1 to Dk1 [a][b][c].length do
7: if Dk1 [a, b, c, d] +D
k
2 [a, b, c, d] == 0 then
8: CCM [a, b, c, d] = 0
9: else
10: CCM [a, b, c, d] = 1
11: end if
12: end for
13: end for
14: Dk[a, b] = editdistance(CCM [a, b])
15: end for
16: end for
12
and revealed to a third party. In general even the information given in the partial
dissimilarity matrices is too much, but we leave it for further improvements to complete
the data-mining without revealing any intermediate results. [See Section of future work
for a discussion on how this can be done.]
Definition A protocol for computing partial dissimilarity matrices is ²-secure if for
all parties, and for all attributes Aij
∣∣P [Aik = x|Dk,M ]− P [Aik = x|D]
∣∣ < ², (2.4)
where M is a transcript of all messages send to a given party.
Theorem 2.5.1 The protocol is private.
Proof Since data holders never receive any information, Equation (2.4) is satisfied
for these parties. Since blinding factors αi are chosen randomly and independent,
Equation (2.4) is also satisfied for TP1. Since attributes ai are chosen from finite fields
ai−αi are also independent of the data, so Equation (2.4) is also satisfied for TP2. The
values received by DM enables DM to build D, where each entry has a random sign
depending on rpng. If rpng is secure, no additional information can be computed.
2.6 Complexity Analysis
In this section, we analyze computation and communication complexity of our proto-
col. Each analysis will be performed for DHs, TPs, and DM separately. We show
effect of different data types to the complexity of our protocol. Since interval-scaled,
binary, nominal, ordinal, and ratio-scaled attributes are treated as numbers as shown
in Subsection 2.4.1, complexity of our protocol for these data types are the same. For
that reason, we denote these data types as numeric attributes throughout our analy-
sis. Therefore complexity analysis of our protocol is given with respect to alphanumeric
and numeric attributes. We also show complexity analysis of the privacy preserving
clustering protocol proposed by Inan et al. [11] to be able to make comparison with
our protocol.
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2.6.1 Computation Complexity
Since computation of secret shares of private inputs can be performed in parallel by
each DH, computation complexity of our protocol for DHs is O(nmax) for numeric
attributes, where nmax = max(n1, n2, . . . , n`), and O((n × len)max) for alphanumeric
attributes, where (n × len)max = max(n1 × len1, n2 × len2, . . . , n` × len`) and leni is
the average length of alphanumeric attributes for DHi. On the other hand, for [11]
computation complexity of DHs is O(N2) for numeric attributes since data holders
compute shared dissimilarity matrices pairwise which requires serial execution. For
alphanumeric attributes, complexity of [11] is O(N2 × length2), where length is the
average length of alphanumeric attributes for the collective database.
In our protocol, for TPs, computation of secret share of Dk yields complexities of
O(N2) for numeric, and O(N2 × length2) for alphanumeric attributes, which is due to
computation of the global dissimilarity matrix, if we assume TPs operate in parallel
and rpng is generated in advance. In [11], there is only one TP and computation com-
plexity of TP is O(N2) for numeric, and O(N2× length2) for alphanumeric attributes.
Complexity of our protocol for DH is O(N2) for numeric attributes which is the
cost of computing Dk. For alphanumeric attributes, DH computes CCM and Dk
resulting in a complexity of O(N2× length2). There is no DM in [11]. We summarize
computation complexities of the protocols for each party in Table 3.1.
Table 2.1: Computation Complexities of our Protocol and [11]
Attribute Type DH TP DM
Numeric O(nmax) O(N
2) O(N2)
Numeric for [11] O(N2) O(N2) −
Alphanumeric O((n× len)max) O(N
2 × length2) O(N2 × length2)
Alphanumeric for [11] O(N2 × length2) O(N2 × length2) −
2.6.2 Communication Complexity
In our protocol, each DH sends secret shares of their private inputs to TPs resulting
in a total communication complexity of O(N) and O(N × length) for numeric and
alphanumeric attributes respectively. TPs send secret shares of Dk to DM and the
total communication complexity is O(N2) for numeric attributes, and O(N2× length2)
for alphanumeric attributes. Since final clustering is done by DM , there is no further
communication cost.
On the other hand, in [11], each DH sends local and shared dissimilarity matrices
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to TP where global dissimilarity matrix is computed. Accordingly, communication
complexity is O(N2) for numeric attributes, and O(N2 × length2) for alphanumeric
attributes. Summary of the communication complexity analysis is depicted in Table
3.2.
Table 2.2: Communication Complexities of our Protocol and [11]
Attribute Type DH TP Total
Numeric O(N) O(N2) O(N2)
Numeric for [11] O(N2) − O(N2)
Alphanumeric O(N × length) O(N2 × length2) O(N2 × length2)
Alphanumeric for [11] O(N2 × length2) − O(N2 × length2)
2.7 Implementation and Performance Evaluation
In this chapter, performance evaluation of our protocol is explained and discussed in
detail with comparison to the protocol proposed in [11]. Our distributed clustering
protocol and [11] do not result in any loss of accuracy. Therefore, we perform only two
tests: communication cost analysis and computation cost analysis. The experiments
are conducted on an Intel Dual-Core Centrino PC with 2 MB cache, 2 GB RAM
and 1.83 GHz clock speed. We used C# programming language to implement the
algorithms.
2.7.1 Experimental Setup
To measure the performance of our protocol and [11], three test cases are identified.
These test cases are for different values of the following entities:
1. Total number of entities (total database size)
2. Average length of alphanumeric attributes
3. Number of data holders
To show performance of our protocol over different attribute types, each test case is
performed over numeric and alphanumeric attributes. For numeric attributes, we use
two different data types: integer and double. Since test results for integer and double
valued attribute values are similar, only test results for double data type are included
due to space consideration.
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For each experiment, we measure the communication and computation overhead of our
protocol against the protocol proposed in [11], where each attribute value is blinded
by random disguise factors which are removed at the end revealing the final result.
[11] and our protocol only differ in the formation of the global dissimilarity matrix.
After global dissimilarity matrix is formed, a clustering algorithm takes this matrix
as input and the clustering is performed the same way in both protocols. Therefore,
comparisons of these protocols in the experiments are done with respect to formation
of the global dissimilarity matrices and clustering is not taken into consideration. For
all the experiments, we denote our protocol as “Our protocol” and [11] as “protocol” in
the figures. Except for the experiments on the number of data holders, we partitioned
the generated datasets into four by distributing them into four datasets evenly so that
each data holder has a balanced share.
For test case (1), we used total database sizes of 2K, 4K, 6K, 8K and 10K. Test case
(2) shows the behavior of the baseline protocol and our protocol for varying average
lengths of the alphanumeric attribute which are 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25. In test case (3),
number of data holders, excluding the third party, is 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10.
For each test case, we first use synthetically generated datasets. Synthetic datasets
are more appropriate for our experiments since we try to evaluate scalability and effi-
ciency of our protocol for varying parameters, and synthetic datasets can be generated
by controlling the number of entities, number of data holders, and average length of
attributes. Data generator is developed in Eclipse Java environment. For the numeric
attributes, each entity is chosen from the interval [0, 10000] uniformly, where precision
for double data type is set to three. For alphanumeric attributes, we created sequence
of characters whose length is chosen in accordance with normal distribution, the mean
value being equal to average length of the attribute and alphabet size is equal to four.
The reason for choosing alphabet size as four is to imitate behavior of DNA data in
our experiments.
We also use KDD’99 Network Intrusion Detection stream dataset [1] to show the perfor-
mance of our protocol over real datasets. We chose ’src bytes’ attribute of this dataset
as our target attribute, which is numeric. To make tests over real numeric datasets
compatible with tests over synthetic datasets, we divide real datasets into datasets of
size 2K, 4K, 6K, 8K and 10K.
In our experiments, we use Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cipher to generate
pseudo-random numbers to hide data holders’ inputs. We use Cryptography namespace
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of MS .Net platform to perform AES encryption in the implementation of our protocol
and [11]. For our protocol, keys and initialization vectors (IVs) are chosen by each
data holder independent of the others, while for [11], seeds for pseudo-random number
generator shared between data holders are used as keys and an initialization vector
(IV) globally known to every data holder is used. Ciphertext as a result of encryption
of IV by AES key is used as the pseudo-random number. For the next random number
generation, random number (ciphertext) generated in the previous step is used as the
message (plaintext) to be encrypted which yields the next random number as a result.
In our implementation, we use 128 bits AES encryption. We preferred AES for sake
of simplicity and safety. Nevertheless, a faster PRNG based on a stream cipher (such
as SEAL) can also be used to decrease the overhead in the computation complexity of
the proposed protocol.
2.7.2 Computation Cost Analysis
Comparison of computation costs for our protocol and [11] for varying database sizes
from 2K to 10K is depicted in Figure 2.2. For numeric attributes, Figures 2.2(a)
and 2.2(b) show that both our protocol and [11] behave quadratically which is due to
formation of global dissimilarity matrix. However our protocol performs better than
[11] since data holders operate in parallel in our protocol and the overall computa-
tion cost for each data holder is n AES encryption for computing secret shares of the
data, where n is database size of each data holder. However, [11] performs n AES
encryptions at each data holder to disguise data values and n AES encryptions at TP
to remove these disguise factors. As a result, [11] performs k ∗ n AES encryptions
more than our protocol where there are k data holders. As Figures 2.2(a) and 2.2(b)
show, execution time difference between our protocol and [11] gets larger as database
size increases since number of AES encryptions performed at TP also increases. On
the other hand, in our protocol no encryption is performed by any party other than
data holders. Comparing performance results of numeric attributes for real and syn-
thetic datasets, execution time for real dataset is slightly greater than execution time
of synthetic dataset due to implementation of our protocol since dissimilarity matrices
are formed in double data type which requires conversion of real datasets from type
integer to type double.For alphanumeric attributes, the situation is similar to numeric
attributes. However for alphanumeric attributes the difference in execution times are
larger than numeric attributes since extra number of AES encryptions that have to be
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performed is n ∗ l where l is the average length of alphanumeric attribute.
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Figure 2.2: Computation cost for different database sizes: (a) For numeric attribute
from synth. dataset. (b) For numeric attribute from real dataset. (c) For alphanumeric
attributes.
Our protocol outperforms [11] when number of data holders increases. For this ex-
periment, we generate a dataset of 10K entities and then horizontally partitioned this
dataset by distributing the complete dataset over the data holders so that each party
holds the same number of entities. As depicted in Figure 2.3, execution time for [11]
increases as number of data holders increases. This is due to the fact that, Ck2 number
of pairwise computation between data holders have to be performed to compute shared
dissimilarity matrices where k is total number of data holders. However, increase in
total execution time for [11] gets smaller as number of data holders increases since
amount of data owned by each data holder gets smaller. On the other hand, increase
in number of data holders reduces total execution time for our protocol since share of
each data holder gets smaller which means less encryption is performed by data holders
in parallel. In our protocol, the computation cost of TPs and DM does not effect from
the change in number of data holders.
To measure the relation between the length of alphanumeric attributes and the exe-
cution time, we generate 6K alphanumeric entities with varying average lengths. The
total execution times of the protocols are depicted in Figure 2.4. Accordingly, execution
times of the protocols with increasing average attribute length increase quadratically as
expected for our protocol and [11]. The execution time difference between our protocol
and [11] can be explained with the same reasoning as Figure 2.2(c).
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Figure 2.3: Computation cost for different number of data holders: (a) For numeric
attribute from synth. dataset. (b) For numeric attribute from real dataset. (c) For
alphanumeric attributes.
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Figure 2.4: Computation cost for different average alphanumeric attribute lengths
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2.7.3 Communication Cost Analysis
Overall communication costs of our protocol and [11] for various database sizes are de-
picted in Figure 2.5. As seen in the figures, overall communication cost of our protocol
is almost twice of [11] for both numeric and alphanumeric attributes. This is due to
secret sharing employed in our protocol where two shares are created for each entity.
Both our protocol and [11] behave quadratically since overall communication cost is
dominated by communication cost of dissimilarity matrices. Figures 2.5(a) and 2.5(b)
also show that communication cost for synthetic dataset is larger than real dataset
since synthetic dataset is in double data format stored in 64 bits while real dataset is
in integer data format stored in 32 bits. On the other hand, apart from the overall
communication cost, communication cost of data holders for our protocol and [11] is
depicted in Figure 2.6. As shown in Figure 2.6, communication cost of our protocol
for data holders is linear in the size of each data holders dataset while [11] requires
quadratic communication for data holders. For that reason, communication cost of our
protocol for data holders is negligible compared to [11]. Accordingly, our protocol puts
the communication burden over trusted third parties and requires negligible amount of
communication from data holders which are resource limited. On the other hand [11]
requires all the communication performed by data holders. However our protocol is
more appropriate for the real life situation as seen from the example given in Section
3.1.
Analysis of overall communication costs for different number of data holders is de-
picted in Figure 2.7. A dataset containing 10K entities is evenly distributed among
data holders in these tests. As the figures show, communication cost of our protocol
remains the same for different number of data holders since collective database size
is the same. On the other hand, [11] shows an increase in communication cost when
number of data holders increase. However the amount of increase in communication
cost gets smaller as number of data holders increase, due to the same reasoning as in
Figure 2.3. As the figure shows, overall communication cost of our protocol is more
than [11]. However when communication costs of data holders are compared, our pro-
tocol outperforms [11] as shown in Figure 2.8. The same reasoning as in Figure 2.6 is
also applicable to Figure 2.8.
Figure 2.9 depicts the relation between communication cost and average length of al-
phanumeric attributes for both protocols. As seen in the figure, both protocols behave
quadratically with respect to increase in the average length of alphanumeric attributes.
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Figure 2.5: Overall communication cost for different database sizes: (a) For numeric
attribute from synth. dataset. (b) For numeric attribute from real dataset. (c) For
alphanumeric attributes.
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Figure 2.6: Communication cost of data holders for different database sizes: (a) For
numeric attribute from synth. dataset. (b) For numeric attribute from real dataset.
(c) For alphanumeric attributes.
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Figure 2.7: Overall communication cost for different numbers of data holders: (a) For
numeric attribute from synth. dataset. (b) For numeric attribute from real dataset.
(c) For alphanumeric attributes.
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Figure 2.8: Communication cost of data holders for different numbers of data holders:
(a) For numeric attribute from synth. dataset. (b) For numeric attribute from real
dataset. (c) For alphanumeric attributes.
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Figure 2.9: Overall communication cost for different average alphanumeric attribute
lengths
However, the amount of increase in the communication cost is higher for our protocol
than [11] due to redundant communication caused by secret sharing.
2.8 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the advantages of our protocol against [11] proposed by Inan
et al. There are two reasons why we choose [11] for comparison. Firstly, [11] is the most
recently proposed privacy preserving clustering protocol. Secondly, [11] has the most
similar structure to our protocol which provides fairness throughout our discussion.
[11] separates data holders into two: initiators and followers. Initiator i starts secure
difference protocol by sending its disguised inputs. Follower receives the disguised
values and computes difference of each of its input to i’s input. The main problem
with this setting is synchronization of data holders. In other words, follower has to
be idle and ready for computation when an initiator sends its input, which is hard
to manage in large distributed systems. On the other hand, our protocol requires no
interaction between data holders which means no synchronization requirements.
Dissimilarity matrices are computed in terms of local and shared dissimilarity matri-
ces in [11], where DM computes the final dissimilarity matrix by merging these local
and shared dissimilarity matrices received from data holders. This structure causes
quadratic computation and communication complexities for data holders with respect
to size of data holders’ local database. However it is more realistic to assume that data
holders have limited computation capabilities and to leave computation of dissimilarity
matrix to trusted third parties with high computation power, which is the case in our
protocol. Accordingly, computation and communication complexities of our protocol
for data holders are linear with the size of data holders’ databases.
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Another problem with [11] is that, each initiator-follower and initiator-DM pairs
has to share a pseudo-random number generator seed which brings forward the problem
of seed generation and deployment in large distributed environments. However in our
protocol, merely one pseudo-random number generator seed between the two-trusted
third parties is shared.
In [11], the pseudo-random numbers used to disguise which attribute is subtracted
from the other is the same within each columns of shared dissimilarity matrix. If we
assume a shared dissimilarity matrix D of size m×n for DHx and DHy, then DM can
easily say that it is always D[j, k] = axj − a
y
k or D[j, k] = a
y
k − a
x
j for j = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
Based on this observation, DM can find out the maximum and minimum attributes in
DHx∪DHy by simply checking signs(positive, negative, zero) of the entries of D since
only for minimum and maximum attribute values, all entries of a column of D have
the same sign. If there is no such column in D, this means minimum and maximum
attribute values reside in DHx. However even if one such column exist in D, DM can
figure out with a certain confidence all the elements in DHx ∪ DHy if the domain of
possible values for that attribute is small. However this is not the case in our protocol
since for each entry of the dissimilarity matrix, a different pseudo-random number is
used.
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CHAPTER 3
An Efficient Solution to
Millionaires’ Problem
3.1 Introduction
Secure evaluation of the greater-than function GT(x, y) tries to answer the question “Is
x greater than y?” without revealing inputs of the function (a.k.a Yao’s Millionaires’
problem). Several studies have been done on that issue; however most of these are
inefficient in the sense that communication and computation costs are very large. In
this study, we propose a more efficient solution to this problem taking [1] as our main
reference point. Fischlin [8] proposed a protocol based on quadratic-residuosity bit-
encryption of Goldwasser and Micali [9]. Goldwasser-Micali system (GM) uses modular
exponentiation of each bit of data for an RSA modulus N which results in expansion of
one bit to log(N) bits. There are several approaches [4, 16] to the same problem based
on encryption of each bit of data which are considered to be the most efficient ones.
Nevertheless expansion of bits due to modular exponentiation increases communication
cost. Also Modular exponentiation is costly to encrypt one bit of data.
For that reason, we adopt additive secret sharing to GM and merely use ⊕ oper-
ation to evaluate GT (x, y). Using ⊕ operation in this sense reduces communication
cost drastically since one bit of data is encoded into 2 bits of data. Additive secret
sharing also reduces computation cost due to one ⊕ operation instead of modular
exponentiation for encryption and decryption of the data.
However our protocol settings are a bit different from the protocols [8, 4, 16] for
Yao’s Millionaires’ problem. Our protocol requires existence of two semi-trusted third
parties. Semi-honest third parties obey the rules of the protocol without any collision
or collaboration with any other parties, however they could record whatever they re-
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ceive throughout the whole protocol, they could try to infer useful information out of
the recorded data. Another difference of our protocol with respect to the previously
proposed protocols is that result of the evaluation for GT (x, y) could be delivered to
any party other than owners of the secrets x and y without loss of privacy and security.
This property makes our protocol appropriate for the applications where evaluation
result is required not to be known by the participants of the protocol while a third
party should know the result to form some global rules. Such applications exist for
data mining where a global data miner gets input from different data holders and
try to infer global information out of these different data sources such as clustering,
classification, association rule mining while learning no information about single data
sources. In other words, our protocol is flexible and adaptable for several applications
with its requirements and settings.
3.1.1 Related Work
The first solution to Yao’s Millionaires’ problem is proposed in [27]. However this
approach is far away from being efficient. All of the recent approaches considered to
efficient for solving secure greater-than function evaluation employ encryption as their
main tool to provide security. [16] tries to compare secrets of Alice and Bob, x and y
respectively, based on 0− encoding (S0s ) and 1− encoding (S
1
s ) of these numbers. S
0
s
and S1s of a number are the sets of binary strings such as :
S0s = snsn−1 . . . si+11|si = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n
S1s = snsn−1 . . . si|si = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n
Accordingly, if x > y := 1, then 1 − encoding of x (S1x) has a common element with
0 − encoding of y (S0y). After Alice and Bob has formed S
1
x and S
0
y of their secrets
respectively, the problem of evaluating the greater-than function is reduced to finding
intersection of S1x and S
0
y . If S
1
x∩S
0
y 6= ∅, then x > y := 1. [16] utilizes ElGamal Homo-
morphic Encryption scheme [5] to find intersection of S1x and S
0
y by taking advantage
of multiplicative homomorphic property of ElGamal Encryption scheme. Multiplica-
tive homomorphic property of ElGamal Encryption scheme provides ability to perform
multiplication over encrypted data, and reveal the multiplication result when data
is decrypted. This way multiplication operation is performed without revealing the
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operands of the multiplication which are secrets. This property can be summarized as:
E(x) ∗ E(y) = E(x ∗ y)
Accordingly, Alice forms a 2×n table T , where T [xj, j] = E(1) and T [¬xj, j] = E(r)
where r is a random number for j=1,2, . . . ,n. Alice sends table T to Bob, where Bob
calculates ct = T [tn, n] ∗ T [tn−1, n − 1] ∗ . . . ∗ T [ti, i] for each t = tntn−1 . . . ti ∈ S
0
y .
Bob randomizes each ct and sends them to Alice, where Alice decides x > y := 1 if
D(ct) = 1. Computation costs for Alice and Bob are 3n log p and 2n log p+2n modular
multiplications respectively, where p is the modulus for ElGamal Encryption and n is
length of the private input. Communication costs for Alice and Bob are 4n log p and
2n log p respectively. As seen from communication and computation cost of [16], the
dominant factor is n log p modular multiplications which is due to encryption of each
bit.
[8] proposes a protocol for secure greater-than function evaluation based on GM-
encryption scheme. GM- encryption is firstly proposed in [9] which uses quadratic-
residuosity to encrypt a bit. Encryption of a bit b with GM-encryption scheme is
performed as the following:
E(b) = zbr2modN
where N = p ∗ q is an RSA modulus, z is a quadratic non-residue of Z∗n with Jacobi
symbol +1, r is a random number such as r ∈ Z∗n. The public key is (N, z) and the
private key is (p, q). GM-encryption scheme shows that E(b) is a quadratic non-residue
if and only if b is 1. Quadratic residuosity of bit b can be recognized efficiently only
if factorization p and q of N are known. GM-encryption scheme has three properties
that [8] uses, which are:
• XOR-property: E(a) ∗ E(b) = E(a⊕ b)
• NOT-property: E(a) ∗ z = E(a⊕ 1) = E(¬a)
• Re-randomization: Rand(E(a)) := E(a) ∗ E(0)
[8] uses a modified version of GM-encryption scheme to implement an AND-homomorphic
encryption scheme (EAND). Accordingly, a bit value b is encrypted as a sequence of λ
encrypted values which are either zE(b) or E(0). With respect to the modified version
27
of GM-encryption scheme, EAND(a) ∗EAND(b), which is pairwise ∗ operation of λ en-
crypted values, is equivalent to the evaluation of a ∧ b for bit values a and b, and the
result is 1 if EAND(a) ∗EAND(b) is a sequence of λ quadratic residues and 0 otherwise.
Greater-than function is formulated as:
x > y := ∨ni=1
(
xi ∧ ¬yi ∧
n
j=i+1 ¬ (xj ⊕ yj)
)
(3.1)
where Equation (3.1) can be computed taking advantage of AND-homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme. The protocol starts when Alice encrypts her own secret x = xnxn−1 . . . x1
as E(xi) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and sends encrypted values to Bob. Bob encrypts his own
secret y = ynyn−1 . . . x1 as E(yi) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and compute encrypted values for
evaluation of ¬ (xj ⊕ yj) as E
¬(xi⊕yi) = NOT (E(xi) ∗ E(yi)). Then Bob calculates
EANDxi = E
AND(E(xi)) and E
AND
yi
= EAND(NOT (E(yi))), and evaluation of Equa-
tions (3.1) is done by GTi = E
AND
xi
∗ EANDyi ∗
∏n
j=i+1E
¬(xj⊕yj). Bob sends GTi’s to
Alice, and Alice concludes that x > y := 1, if one of GTi’s is a sequence of λ quadratic
residues. Computation costs are nλ + 2n and 6nλ modular multiplications, and com-
putation costs are n logN and nλ logN for Alice and Bob respectively where N is an
RSA modulus. Similar to [16], the dominant factor is nλ modular multiplications due
to encryption of each bit.
Another cryptographic protocol for secure greater-than function evaluation is pro-
posed by [4]. Additive homomorphic property of Paillier Cryptosystem [22] is used to
implement this protocol. Additive homomorphism has the following property:
E(x) ∗ E(y) = E(x+ y)
Using Paillier Cryptosystem (E), Alice initializes the protocol by encrypting each bit
of her secret x = xnxn−1 . . . x1 as E(xi) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and sends encrypted values
to Bob. Then Bob follows a five step process:(1) Computes E(di) = E(xi − yi), (2)
Computes E(fi) = E(xi ⊕ yi) = E((xi − yi)
2) = E(xi − 2xiyi + yi), (3) Computes
E(γi) = E(2γi−1 + fi) where γ0 = 0, (4) Computes E(δi) = E(di + ri(γi − 1)) where
ri ∈R ZN , (5) Permutes E(δi) and sends to Alice. Alice decrypts E(δi), and concludes
that x > y := 1 if there exists a decrypted value +1. Computation costs are 12n logN
and 4n logN+28nmodular multiplications while communication costs are 2n logN and
2n logN for Alice and Bob respectively. The dominant factor is caused by encryption
again which is n logN modular multiplications.
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3.2 Preliminaries
Throughout this chapter, encryption and decryption operations are performed on single
bits. In order to compute a function over a number x, x is represented in binary notation
as x = xnxn−1 . . . x1 which can also be denoted as
∑
xn ∗ 2
n−1 . We write S(x, r) = c
for secret sharing of bit x with random bit r and the corresponding shares of the secret
are assigned to bit r and c = r ⊕ x. Revealing the secret bit x from shares works in
similar fashion as c ⊕ r = x, which means a simple ⊕ operation over shares c and r
results in the original bit x.
3.2.1 XOR Homomorphic Secret Sharing Scheme
We use XOR operation for secret sharing of a bit x of information in the existence of
a random bit r. Basically our secret sharing scheme is:
S⊕(x, r) = c where x⊕ r = c;
For restoring the secret x from c and random bit r, the corresponding procedure is
as the following:
D⊕(c, r) = x where c⊕ r = x;
This additive secret sharing scheme has three properties which will be of great use
in the following sections. These properties are;
1. XOR homomorphism: S⊕(a, ra)⊕ S
⊕(b, rb) = S
⊕(a⊕ b, ra ⊕ rb)
2. NOT property: S⊕(¬a, ra) = 1⊕ S
⊕(a, ra)
3. Rerandomization: Rand(S⊕(a, ra)) := 0 ⊕ S
⊕(a, ra) = S
⊕(r, r) ⊕ S⊕(a, ra) =
S⊕(r ⊕ a, r ⊕ ra)
3.2.2 AND Homomorphic Secret Sharing Scheme
XOR homomorphic secret sharing scheme explained in Section 3.2.1 can be used to
generate an AND homomorphic secret sharing scheme in the following manner: AND
homomorphic secret sharing (S∧) of a bit can be encoded as a sequence of XOR ho-
momorphic secret sharings (S⊕). Encoding of a bit is a sequence of λ elements each
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of which will be either S⊕ of NOT x (S⊕(¬x, r)) or S⊕ of bit 0 (S⊕(0, r)). In other
words;
S∧(x) = S⊕1 (x)|| . . . ||S
⊕
λ (x) (3.2)
S⊕i (x) = S
⊕(¬xi, ri) or S
⊕(0, ri) (3.3)
In Equation (3.3), choice of the value of S⊕i is made by a fair coin flip. For secret
sharing of bit 1, we encode it as a sequence of λ random secret sharings of 0. For secret
sharing of bit 0, we encode it as a sequence of λ random secret sharings of 0 and 1.
Accordingly, computation of (x ∧ y) can be done as the following;
x ∧ y = S∧(x)⊕ S∧(y)
= S⊕1 (x)⊕ S
⊕
1 (y)|| . . . ||S
⊕
λ (x)⊕ S
⊕
λ (y) (3.4)
S⊕i (x) and S
⊕
i (y) uses the same randomness to encrypt bits xi and yi in Equation
(3.4). If result of (S∧(x)⊕S∧(y)) is a sequence of all 0 ’s, this means x∧y = 1. On the
other hand, even if one of the elements in the sequence is 1, then x ∧ y = 0. However,
since value of S⊕i is selected among S
⊕(1, ri) or S
⊕(0, ri) during the encoding phase
of bit 0, there can be failure in the encoding phase with probability of 2−λ if all the
elements in the sequence are chosen as S⊕(0, ri). Another failure scenario is that while
calculating S∧(x) ⊕ S∧(y), a piecewise ⊕ operation of encodings of 1 and 1 results in
encryption of 0 (S⊕(1, ri) ⊕ S
⊕(1, ri) = S
⊕(0, ri)). This kind of cancellation failures
occur with probability of 2−λ. For that reason, λ has to be chosen appropriately to
minimize failure probability.
3.3 Evaluating Greater Than (GT) function
Evaluation of the boolean function f(X,Y ) such as: f(X,Y ) = 1 if X > Y , and
f(X,Y ) = 0 otherwise, can be done by comparison of each number bitwise such as if
X > Y , then xi = 1, and yi = 0, and xj = yj (which can be computed by ¬(xj ⊕ yj))
for all more significant bits [1] which is evaluated by Equation (3.1). Accordingly, GT
function can easily be implemented since the term ¬(xj⊕yj) can be computed by XOR
homomorphic scheme explained in Section 3.2.1, and the term xi∧¬yi∧
n
j=i+1¬ (xj ⊕ yj)
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can be computed by AND homomorphic scheme explained in Section 3.2.2.
Evaluation of GT function based on our XOR and AND homomorphic secret sharing
scheme in Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2 requires presence of two semi-honest third parties(SHTP)
since Equation (3.1) has to be computed securely without revealing any bits of x and
y. Evaluation process starts at Parties X and Y where shares of secret bits xi and
yi are formed by S
⊕. Shares of each secret bit are distributed among SHTP. From
that point on, SHTP start computation to form shares of the evaluation for Equation
(3.1). SHTP share a seed to initialize a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG).
Based on this PRNG, SHTP form two components both: (1) Share of secret xi ∧ ¬yi,
(2)Share of secret ∧nj=i+1¬ (xj ⊕ yj). SHTP compute the first component by employing
an encoding function based on shared PRNG. The encoding function is as the following;
Sciencode(ci, PRNG, inverse) = (ri,j OR ci ⊕ inverse⊕ ri,j) = e
c
i,j (3.5)
S
xi∧¬yi
encode = e
x
i,1 ⊕ e
y
i,1|| . . . ||e
x
i,λ ⊕ e
y
i,λ (3.6)
Encoding function in Equation (3.5) takes three parameters. First parameter ci is
share of the secret for either party X or Party Y. Second parameter is PRNG which
is used to randomize output of the encoding function in Equation (3.5). The third
parameter is the bit value inverse which determines whether to inverse the output or
not. There are two possible outputs of the function in Equation (3.5). To chose among
these possible outputs, shared PRNG is used. If random number created is odd, then
the first output, otherwise the second output is chosen to be the actual output. After
deciding on what is going to be the output, value of the output is calculated. For
that purpose, another random number rnd is created and value of the ri,j is set as
rnd mod 2. Equation (3.5) is called λ times for each bit of the share of the secret.
The second component is computed in a similar fashion by SHTP. The functions
used are;
S
xi,yi
encode(xi, yi, PRNG) = (ri,j OR xi ⊕ yi) = e
x⊕y
i,j (3.7)
S
∧nj=i+1¬(xj⊕yj)
encode = e
x⊕y
j,1 ⊕ . . .⊕ e
x⊕y
n,1 || . . . ||e
x⊕y
j,λ ⊕ . . .⊕ e
x⊕y
n,λ (3.8)
Function in Equation (3.7) takes shares of the secrets for Party X and Y, and
PRNG as parameters. The encoding procedure is same as Equation (3.5). Output of
31
Equation (3.7) is used as input for Equation (3.8) and the resulting output is share of
each semi-trusted parties for component (2).
S
xi∧¬yi∧
n
m=i+1¬(xj⊕yj)
encode = S
xi∧¬yi
encode ⊕ S
∧nm=i+1¬(xj⊕yj)
encode (3.9)
Using Equations (3.5),(3.6),(3.7),(3.8), the shares of the evaluation Equation (3.1)
is calculated. The final share of each SHTP for evaluation of the Equation (3.1) is
calculated by Equation 3.9. However share of the Equation (3.1) can reveal information
about which bit of SecretX and Y fulfill Equation (3.1) when combined in Computation
Site since resulting value for this bit will be a sequence of λ 0’s. Based on this fact,
Computation Site knows that value corresponding to that bit is 1 for Secret X and 0
for Secret Y, and the other more significant bits are equal. To prevent this information
leakage, SHTP will permute their final result with respect to a permutation scheme
they share, before sending their shares of the result to the Computation Site. The
details of the steps, each party follows is given in detail in Section 3.4.
3.4 Our Protocol
Algorithm 7 Party X
Input: Secret value x = xnxn−1 . . . x1
Output: cx1 , c
x
2 , . . . , c
x
n and r
x
1 , r
x
2 , . . . , r
x
n
1: for i = 0 to n do
2: cxi = S
⊕(xi, r
x
i )
3: end for
4: Sends cx1 , c
x
2 , . . . , c
x
n to TRUSTED PARTY 1
5: Sends rx1 , r
x
2 , . . . , r
x
n to TRUSTED PARTY 2
Algorithm 8 Party Y
Input: Secret value y = ynyn−1 . . . y1
Output: cy1, c
y
2, . . . , c
y
n and r
y
1 , r
y
2 , . . . , r
y
n
1: for i = 0 to n do
2: c
y
i = S
⊕(yi, r
y
i )
3: end for
4: Sends cy1, c
y
2, . . . , c
y
n to Trusted party 2
5: Sends ry1 , r
y
2 , . . . , r
y
n to Trusted party 1
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Algorithm 9 Trusted Party 1
Input: cx1 , c
x
2 , . . . , c
x
n and r
y
1 , r
y
2 , . . . , r
y
n
Output: Permuted Matrix GT 1
1: Initialize PRNG with seed shared with Trusted party 2
2: Share permutation scheme with Trusted party 2
3: for i = 1 to n do
4: for j = 1 to λ do
5: exi,j = S
cxi
encode(c
x
i , PRNG, 0)
6: e
y
i,j = S
r
y
i
encode(r
y
i , PRNG, 1)
7: end for
8: end for
9: for i = 1 to n do
10: for j = 1 to λ do
11: S
xi∧¬yi
encode[j] = e
x
i,j ⊕ e
y
i,j
12: end for
13: end for
14: for i = 1 to n do
15: for j = 1 to λ do
16: e
x⊕y
i,j = S
cxi ,r
y
i
encode(c
x
i , r
y
i , PRNG)
17: end for
18: end for
19: for i = 1 to n− 1 do
20: for j = 1 to λ do
21: S
∧nm=i+1¬(xj⊕yj)
encode[j] = e
x⊕y
m,j ⊕ . . .⊕ e
x⊕y
n,j
22: end for
23: end for
24: for i = 1 to n− 1 do
25: for j = 1 to λ do
26: S
xi∧¬yi∧
n
m=i+1¬(xj⊕yj)
encode[j] = S
xi∧¬yi
encode[j] ⊕ S
∧nm=i+1¬(xj⊕yj)
encode[j]
27: end for
28: end for
29: Permute Matrix Sxi∧¬yi∧
n
j=i+1¬(xj⊕yj) with respect to column i’s resulting in GT 1
30: Sends Matrix GT 1 to Computation Site
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Algorithm 10 Trusted Party 2
Input: cy1, c
y
2, . . . , c
y
n and r
x
1 , r
x
2 , . . . , r
x
n
Output: Permuted Matrix GT 2
1: Initialize PRNG with seed shared with Trusted party 1
2: Share permutation scheme with Trusted party 1
3: Negate each Share of Party Y as ¬cyi = 1⊕ c
y
i
4: for i = 1 to n do
5: for j = 1 to λ do
6: exi,j = S
rxi
encode(r
x
i , PRNG, 1)
7: e
y
i,j = S
c
y
i
encode(¬c
y
i , PRNG, 0)
8: end for
9: end for
10: for i = 1 to n do
11: for j = 1 to λ do
12: S
xi∧¬yi
encode[j] = e
x
i,j ⊕ e
y
i,j
13: end for
14: end for
15: for i = 1 to n do
16: for j = 1 to λ do
17: e
x⊕y
i,j = S
rxi ,c
y
i
encode(r
x
i , c
y
i , PRNG)
18: end for
19: end for
20: for i = 1 to n− 1 do
21: for j = 1 to λ do
22: S
∧nm=i+1¬(xj⊕yj)
encode[j] = e
x⊕y
m,j ⊕ . . .⊕ e
x⊕y
n,j
23: end for
24: end for
25: for i = 1 to n− 1 do
26: for j = 1 to λ do
27: S
xi∧¬yi∧
n
m=i+1¬(xj⊕yj)
encode[j] = S
xi∧¬yi
encode[j] ⊕ S
∧nm=i+1¬(xj⊕yj)
encode[j]
28: end for
29: end for
30: Permute Matrix Sxi∧¬yi∧
n
j=i+1¬(xj⊕yj) with respect to column i’s resulting in GT 2
31: Sends Matrix GT 2 to Computation Site
Algorithm 11 Computation Site
Input: GT 1 and GT 2
Output: True if (X > Y ), false otherwise
1: for i = 1 to n do
2: for j = 1 to λ do
3: GT [i][j] = GT 1[i][j]⊕GT 2[i][j]
4: end for
5: end for
6: for i = 1 to n do
7: if GT [i] is a sequence of λ 0’s then
8: return true
9: end if
10: end for
11: return false
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3.5 Complexity Analysis of Our Protocol
In this section, we show computation and communication complexity of our protocol
with comparison to three protocols [8, 4, 16] proposed for greater-than function eval-
uation which are explained in detail in Subsection 3.1.1. The reason why we choose
these three protocols is that they are the most recently proposed protocols which are
considered to be the most efficient solutions to the secure greater-than function evalu-
ation.
3.5.1 Computation Complexity
The summary of computation costs for each protocol is depicted in Table 3.1. Com-
putation cost of our protocols can be explained in terms of Party X, Party Y, Trusted
Party 1, Trusted Party 2, and Computation Site. Party X and Y has the same compu-
tation cost which is composed of n fair coin flip and n ⊕ operations for secret sharing
of bits of secrets x and y. Computational cost of our protocol for Trusted Party 1 is
as the following: 6nλ (= 3 ∗ 2nλ) PRNG for lines 5, 6, and 16, 6nλ (= 6 ∗ nλ) ⊕
operations for lines 5, 6, 11, 16, 21, and 26. Trusted Party 2 has the same computation
cost as Trusted Party 1 if we ignore n ⊕ operations at line 3. Computation cost of
Computation Site is nλ ⊕ operations for line 3. Accordingly computational complexity
of our protocol is dominated by nλ PRNG. If we assume that 128 bits AES is used for
pseudo-random number generation, then complexity of our protocol is nλ logS where
S is an AES modulus. As explained in detail in Subsection 3.1.1, computational com-
plexity of [16],[4], and [8] are dominated by n log p, n logN , and nλ logN modular
multiplications respectively. Assuming a conservative security level for each protocol ,
we can say that it is possible to take log p = 512, logN = 512 and logS = 128.
Table 3.1: Comparison of Computation Cost for Different Protocols
Protocol Party X Party Y STTP1 STTP2
[8] (nλ+ 2n)m (6nλ)m - -
[4] (12n logN)m (4n logN + 28n)m - -
[16] (3n log p)m (2n log p+ 2n)m - -
Our Protocol nc+ nx nc+ nx 6nλx+ 6nλr 6nλx+ 6nλr + nx
*m, c, x, r stand for modular multiplication, fair coin flip, bitwise ⊕ operation, and
pseudo-random number generation respectively. *p is ElGamal modulus *N is RSA
modolus *n is length of private inputs in bits
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3.5.2 Communication Complexity
Communication costs of our protocol are 2n for Party X and Party Y , and nλ for
Trusted Party 1 and 2. The summary of communication costs for all protocols are
depicted in Table 3.2. According to Table 3.2, our protocol causes a dramatic reduction
in communication cost compared to previously proposed protocols.
Table 3.2: Comparison of Communication Cost for Different Protocols
Protocol Party X Party Y STTP1 STTP2 Total
[8] n logN nλ logN - - n logN(λ+ 1)
[4] 2n logN 2n logN - - 4n logN
[16] 4n log p 2n log p - - 6n log p
Our Protocol 2n 2n nλ nλ 4n+ 2nλ
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CHAPTER 4
Conclusion and Future Work
In this thesis, we have shown two very efficient protocols which are useful for data
mining. The efficiency was achieved by observing that the use of two (or three) semi-
honest non-colluding third parties is realistic in a data mining setting.
Our solution to Yao’s millionaires problem is of independent interest, since it im-
proves over existing protocols in both communication complexity and computation
complexity. It is, to the best of our knowledge, the best solution so far. Our solution
is based on the solution by Fischlin, but whereas Fischlin uses only one semi-honest
third party, we use two. Compared to Fischlin, our protocol has communication over-
head of 2λ, whereas practical implementations of Fischlin will have communication
overhead several orders of magnitudes more. Fischlin’s protocol uses exponentiation
of cipher-texts in the evaluation of each Boolean circuit, wheres our protocol executed
the Boolean circuit directly on bits (2λ bits in parallel).
Secondly by utilizing our numerical distance protocol, we proposed a privacy pre-
serving distributed clustering protocol for horizontally partitioned data using secret
sharing scheme, which is homomorphic with respect to addition operation. The model
that we adopted is unprecedented in the sense that it uses two non-colluding third
parties. The idea of using two third parties that greatly alleviates the computation
and communication burden of the data holders is especially useful in applications such
as sensor networks and RFID where data holders are resource-limited sensor nodes and
RFID readers. When compared to the most efficient former techniques, which exclu-
sively rely on the computation and communication capabilities of the data holders, our
protocol can run even on the most simple data holders, such sensor nodes or RFID
readers. One can even think that there is no need for the data holders to store the
actual data. It is true that the communication overhead between the two third parties
is greater than the other protocols. Nevertheless, third parties can easily be equipped
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with high computation capability and bandwidth.
The use of two third parties and non-collusion property are realistic when they are
chosen to have conflicting interests in the data mining results of the actual data. As
an example, one third party can be a consumer organization who is interested in the
privacy of consumers, while the other is representative of the industry - they both have
interests in the right outcome, but will never collude.
We proved information theoretically that the third parties cannot gather any infor-
mation about the data under the non-colluding assumption. Therefore, our protocol
adopts a stronger security model than computational infeasibility, which is used by the
majority of other privacy preserving data mining algorithms.
Other two benefits of the proposed protocol are that the data holders do not need
to be synchronized or to share keys. Almost all previously proposed methods rely
on synchronous and interactive protocols, where data holders must always be on-line
during the protocol execution, while the data holders in our protocol can send the shares
of their data asynchronously at their convenience. Since there is no communication
between the data holders, there is no need for them to share keys; therefore there is no
key distribution problem.
And finally, the model based on the use of two third parties and homomorphic
secret sharing can be extended to other data types and different dissimilarity metrics.
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